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The debate over the use of tariﬀs or value added taxes in developing countries has
focused on the diﬃculty of collecting VAT from the informal sector of the economy. This
paper contributes by considering this issue with heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous
entry. This yields two new results. First, a cut in the tariﬀ in and of itself can reduce
the size of the informal sector. Second, the imposition of a VAT need not increase the
number of informal ﬁrms. In fact, for many parameterizations of the model, higher
VAT reduces informality. Despite this, whether a revenue neutral shift from tariﬀs to
VAT increases or decreases welfare depends on the parametrization. Therefore while
this move may be welfare improving in some cases, it is not a one-size ﬁts all policy.
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11 Introduction
The list of challenges facing developing countries includes, like all nations, the need to raise
government revenues to provide for public expenditures. Developing nations, more so than
their wealthier counterparts, are hindered in this by the presence of a large informal sector
from which it is diﬃcult to collect taxes. 1 This has led them to seek alternative tax bases
that are easier to target. Chief among these are imported goods since trading ﬁrms can
be assessed tariﬀs as they enter the country through (relatively) well monitored ports. In
contrast to developed countries, as shown in Table 1, tariﬀs in the developing world form a
large part of their government revenues. In the current era of globalization, however, this
has come under ﬁre both from free trade proponents as well as those favoring potentially
less distortionary taxes such as value added taxes (VAT). Since tariﬀs apply only to foreign
ﬁrms but VAT applies evenly to domestic and foreign ﬁrms, authors such as Keen (2008)
suggest that a movement from tariﬀs towards VAT would reduce distortions and increase
welfare.2 This has been countered by Piggott and Whalley (2001) and Emran and Stiglitz
(2005), who suggest that an increase in the VAT would encourage domestic ﬁrms to switch
from the formal to the informal sector, a move that reduces the eﬀectiveness of the VAT in
developing countries and causes distortions that lower overall welfare.
The goal of this paper is to compare these two eﬀects in a model where imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivities and where the number of ﬁrms is endogenous.
This approach was popularized by Melitz (2003) and has been applied to a number of is-
sues including optimal tariﬀs (Cole and Davies, 2009), subsidies for FDI (Chor, 2009), tax
competition for FDI (Davies and Eckel, forthcoming), and payroll taxes with informal labor
markets (Paz, 2009). Doing so has several advantages and yields additional insight into the
impact a shift from tariﬀs towards VAT would have. In particular, we show three things.
1Estimates provided by Schneider and Enste (2000) suggest that the informal sector in developing nations
is 39 percent of GDP. In contrast, it amounts to 12 percent of GDP in developed countries.
2Ebrill, et. al (2001) and Bird and Gendron (2007) provide overviews of the use of VAT in developing
countries.
2First, a cut in the tariﬀ leads to a contraction in the informal sector due to an inﬂux of
new foreign competitors. 3 Second, when the VAT penalty is increasing in the VAT rate
(as is done in practice), a rise in the VAT can further reduce the size of the informal sector
due to an increase in the expected penalty. Therefore it need not be the case that a shift
from tariﬀs towards VAT will increase the size of the informal economy. Finally, we show
that even in the context of our model, that the impact of this shift is complex since these
two instruments result in complex and conﬂicting impacts on the numbers and outputs of
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. Therefore the welfare and revenue impacts of implementing such a
change are likely to be country speciﬁc.
These new results come from three key aspects of our endogenous entry with heteroge-
neous ﬁrms model. First, in contrast to the perfectly competitive settings of Piggott and
Whalley (2001), Emran and Stiglitz (2005), and Boadway and Sato (2009), this is a model
of imperfect competition. This is important because, as discussed by Keen and Ligthart
(2002), many of the welfare predictions regarding tariﬀs versus VAT can change dramat-
ically when imperfect competition is introduced. One such impact is that we ﬁnd that a
tariﬀ reduction lowers domestic VAT receipts because of the additional competition from
foreigners reduces output from domestic ﬁrms. Second, with endogenous entry, changes in
the set of ﬁrms active in a country (due, for instance to a change in tariﬀs or in the VAT)
creates selection eﬀects, changing the mass of ﬁrms and average productivities a heretofore
unrecognized impacts of a shift from tariﬀs towards VAT. Analysis of these beneﬁts has been
a central part of the recent trade theory building from Melitz (2003). One implication of
this is that a tariﬀ reduction reduces entry of informal ﬁrms. This combined with the ﬁrst
result is why a tariﬀ reduction reduces size of the informal sector, a factor that has not been
discussed previously in the literature. Third, heterogeneity allows ﬁrms to self-select into
the formal and informal sectors without a knife-edge result wherein all ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between the two (such as Boadway and Sato (2009)) or an exogenous assignment of ﬁrms to
3Note that consistent with the debate, we consider a unilateral reduction in the developing, home country’s
tariﬀ, not a coordinated tariﬀ reduction resulting from a trade agreement.
3formal or informal sectors (such as Emran and Stiglitz (2005)).4 If the probability that an
informal ﬁrm is caught avoiding the VAT is increasing in output or proﬁts, both of which
are positively correlated with productivity, we ﬁnd that the most productive, largest, and
proﬁtable ﬁrms will endogenously choose to be formal and pay their VAT with small, infor-
mal, low-productivity ﬁrms choosing the informal route. However, since even informal ﬁrms
face a probability of detection, changes in the VAT still impacts their output decisions with
higher VAT often leading to lower output. In fact, in some parameterizations, an increase
in the VAT can itself reduce the size of the informal sector (a result found in many of our
simulations), a possibility missing from the literature.
In addition to these results, the model highlights important diﬀerences between the eﬀects
of tariﬀs and VAT. Since tariﬀs only impact domestic ﬁrms through competition whereas
VAT also impacts them directly, the various forces at play result in conﬂicting eﬀects on
competition and government revenues. For example, a revenue neutral increase in the VAT
has two conﬂicting eﬀects on domestic ﬁrms. First, a rise in the VAT increases the costs
for domestic formal ﬁrms. Similarly, since an increase in the VAT increases the penalty
should an informal ﬁrm be caught, it increases expected costs for informal ﬁrms. These
eﬀects lower output by all domestic ﬁrms, regardless of their formality. It also leads to
the exit of low-productivity domestic ﬁrms. Similarly, the VAT increases the cost to foreign
exporters, reducing the number of exporting ﬁrms and the selling price for those that remain.
This reduction in foreign competition also has an indirect eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms, however,
tending to increase their output and proﬁts. The net eﬀect of a VAT increases is therefore
ambiguous. Tariﬀs, however, only aﬀect domestic ﬁrms through this second eﬀect. Thus, as
demonstrated by our simulation results, it is possible for a tariﬀ reduction to decrease the
size of the informal sector while a VAT increase could increase it. Therefore the impact of a
revenue neutral shift from tariﬀs to VAT is a complex and theoretically ambiguous aﬀair.
These changes in the number of ﬁrms and their output then feed directly into welfare
4Piggott and Whalley (2001) avoid the knife edge by considering agents that split time across sectors
where decreasing returns yield internal solutions.
4through three channels: the price consumers pay, the number of varieties available to them,
and aggregate income. As noted by Cole and Davies (2009), more productive ﬁrms form a
larger part of the consumer’s consumption basket because their lower costs mean that they
have lower prices. As a result, lowering tariﬀs beneﬁts consumers because the price reduction
on high-productivity imports outweighs the loss in the number of varieties. Chor (2009)
provides a comparable rationale for FDI subsidies. Thus, consistent with the argument of
Keen (2008), lowering the tariﬀ reduces distortions. However, as asserted by Emran and
Stiglitz (2005), a revenue neutral increase in the VAT is not without its own distortions. As
with the tariﬀ reduction, depending on the parameters of the model, the increase in the VAT
can reduce the number of varieties available to consumers. Furthermore, unlike the tariﬀ
reduction, the VAT increase raises prices on all varieties, including those for domestic ﬁrms.
This includes the most productive domestic ﬁrms, formal ﬁrms that comprise the bulk of
the heterogeneous goods production. This has a negative welfare impact. Finally, it must
be remembered that in addition to these changes, movements in tariﬀs or VAT also impact
the proﬁtability of domestic ﬁrms, resulting in changes to aggregate domestic income and
welfare.
Because of the conﬂicting impacts of the VAT and the complexity of the model, we use
simulation results to compute the eﬀects arising from a revenue neutral shift from tariﬀs
to VAT. First, we ﬁnd that the size of the informal sector is generally falling in the VAT,
i.e. the direct cost eﬀect of a VAT increase outweighs the indirect competition eﬀect. This
demonstrates that it is not always the case that a movement from tariﬀs to VAT increases
informality. Second, the move from a tariﬀ to a VAT causes an ambiguous change in welfare.
When this switch leads to increases in imports and improvements in consumer surplus arising
from more and cheaper imported varieties, this outweighs the negative eﬀects caused by VAT
distortions and welfare improves. When those beneﬁts are small, welfare tends to fall. This
latter case tends to dominate when countries are closed, VAT rates are initially low, and the
elasticity of substitution among varieties is high. This then suggests that although the move
5recommended by Keen (2008) and others can indeed increase welfare, it is not a one size ﬁts
all policy. Therefore care must be exercised when applying it to a given country.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and describes the equilibrium
for given tariﬀs and VAT. Section 3 discusses how this equilibrium changes in the two policies.
Section 4 utilizes simulations of the model to analyze the impact of a revenue neutral shift
from tariﬀs towards VAT. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a setting with two countries, Home and Foreign. Foreign variables will be denoted
by ∗. Our goal is an analysis of a shift from tariﬀs to VAT in the home country. Since the
situation in foreign is analogous to that in home and not our primary focus, we will refer to
the foreign case only insofar as it inﬂuences the equilibrium in home. Also, for expositional
purposes, we will use the term “domestic” to refer to home. Each country produces two
goods, Y , a numeraire, and X, a diﬀerentiated good. In addition, each country provides a
publicly-provided good G to its citizens.
2.1 Consumers
Preferences are identical across consumers and countries. The normative representative
consumer maximizes a quasi-linear utility function that is additively separable in Y , X, and
G. Furthermore, for X preferences exhibit the Dixit-Stiglitz ”love for variety”. This utility
function is:









where µ and µG are positive, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and Ω is the set of varieties
available to home consumers (either from domestic production or imports). 5Aggregate
5One interpretation of the publicly provided good is that the government uses revenues to purchase the
numeraire which is then converted into a consumption good under constant returns to scale. This more
complex setup would amount to this formulation for utility.




p(i)x(i)di + Yk  I (2)
where I is the aggregate income arising from wages and the proﬁts of domestically-owned
ﬁrms. We assume that parameter values are such that in equilibrium both the diﬀerentiated
product X and the numeraire Y are consumed in positive amounts. 6 The solution to this








1  is the home price index. Intuitively, this is the cost of buying
one unit of X, taking into account the optimal amount purchased of each variety. Further,
the quasi-linearity of the utility function is such that total expenditure on the diﬀerentiated
good is equal to µ. This constant expenditure on the diﬀerentiated good is a useful property
of the quasi-linear preference relationship since it eliminates feedback income eﬀects from
changes in tariﬀs and taxes. This allows us to focus exclusively on how they impact the
market through ﬁrm choices while setting aside the diﬀering income eﬀects arising from the
fact that the VAT directly aﬀects the proﬁt of domestic ﬁrms whereas tariﬀs do so only
indirectly. 7 A foreign demand curve can be derived that is analogous to (3).
2.2 The Numeraire Sector
The numeraire sector, Y is produced under constant returns to scale where units are nor-
malized so that the unit labor requirement is equal to one. The good is freely traded and
sold under perfect competition at a constant price of one. This results in an equilibrium
6Note that with quasi-linear preferences and a representative consumer, this assumes that all consumers
have at least a minimal level of income.
7The simplifying properties of the quasi-linear preference structure have been exploited by Chor (2009),
Cole and Davies (2009), and others.
7wage rate equal to one. For simplicity we assume that in equilibrium, parameter values are
such that the numeraire is produced in each country.
2.3 The Diﬀerentiated Product Sector
The diﬀerentiated product sector is characterized by a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms. This diﬀers considerably from Piggott and Whalley (2001), Emran and Stiglitz
(2005), and Boadway and Sato (2009) who assume perfect competition. In a model with
homogeneous but imperfectly-competitive ﬁrms, Keen and Ligthart (2002) demonstrate that
the welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs and VAT can be quite diﬀerent than when perfect competition
is assumed. Therefore we too utilize imperfect competition. Each ﬁrm i is exogenously
assigned a productivity parameter a(i) which is distributed according to a c.d.f. function
G(i) with associated p.d.f. g(i).8 9 This productivity parameter is equal to the unit labor
requirement, and thus the marginal unit cost, of the ﬁrm. This is increasing in i. In addition
to production costs, ﬁrms require labor to cover ﬁxed costs. With knowledge of its produc-
tivity parameter, the ﬁrm must make two choices: which markets to serve (the local market,
the overseas market through exports, both, or neither) and whether to do so formally (i.e.
pay the VAT rate v) or informally (and run the risk of being caught out). 10 Since ﬁrm
decisions are analogous in both countries, we will derive the home ﬁrm results and note the
diﬀerences when necessary.
8For expositional purposes, we will often refer to an index i as representing a single ﬁrm rather than a mass
of ﬁrms, however, this is just to make for a smoother, more intuitive discussion of the model’s components.
9It is common in heterogeneous ﬁrm models to have entrepreneurs draw from this distribution of pro-
ductivities at a cost. The advantage to this is that potential entrepreneurs continue to take draws until the
expected proﬁt of doing so is zero, implying that in equilibrium, total ﬁrm proﬁts sum to zero. This, however,
adds complications to the model impeding tractability. Since our quasi-linear preferences remove some of the
burden that positive equilibrium proﬁts create, we use this alternative approach. Nevertheless, as discussed
by Cole (2008) and Jørgensen and Shr¨ oder (2009) the two approaches yield generally comparable results.
10Some models of this type (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) also include the choice to engage in
foreign direct investment. Since developing countries receive little FDI, and to simplify the analysis, we
ignore this option.
8Supposing that ﬁrm i is formal, its proﬁt from serving the domestic market is:
π
formal
dom (i) = (1   v)p(i)q(i)   (a(i)q(i) + F). (4)
where F is its ﬁxed cost and v is the VAT. Note that since the ﬁrm’s only input is labor, the




















(σ−1)µ   F (7)
where Ψ  σ
(σ−1). Note that both quantity and proﬁt are decreasing in i, i.e. the most
productive ﬁrms are the largest and most proﬁtable. In addition, note that the equilibrium
domestic output of a formal ﬁrm is decreasing in the price index.
In addition to serving the domestic market, ﬁrm i can choose to export to the foreign
market. 11 In order to do so, the ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost Fx > F. In addition, following
standard practice, an exporter is exempt from the domestic VAT but must pay the foreign
VAT v∗. Furthermore, they face an ad valorem tariﬀ τ∗ on their exports. Using the foreign
version of (3), this results in an equilibrium price, quantity, and proﬁt of:
p
formal




























∗(σ−1)µ   Fx. (10)
11Munk (2008) considers a small country Ricardian model where the home country completely specializes
in the production of one good. As the country is small and markets are perfectly competitive, he concludes
that VATs dominate tariﬀs depending on the costs of implementation. This analysis diﬀers from ours in
many ways, not the least of which is that we do not have complete specialization even for a small country.
9We assume that the home country is small in the Flam and Helpman (1987) sense that
it cannot inﬂuence the number of foreign ﬁrms. Given that our focus is on developing
countries, we feel this is appropriate in the present context. For future use, we also present
the analogous condition for foreign exporters to home:
π
∗formal










(σ−1)µ   Fx (11)
Alternatively, a ﬁrm can choose to be informal. In this case, they do not pay the VAT
unless they are caught, which happens with probability η(i) which is decreasing in their
index. 12 Since ﬁrms with low indexes produce more and have higher proﬁts, this means
that the largest, most productive, most proﬁtable ﬁrms are also the most likely to be caught.
For simplicity, we assume that η(0) = 1, i.e. the most productive ﬁrm is caught with
certainty if they attempt to avoid the VAT. In addition, we assume that ﬁrms that engage in
international trade (be they home or foreign exporters) are also caught with certainty should
they attempt to avoid the VAT. This is functionally comparable to Keen (2008) who assumes
that informal goods are by deﬁnition non-tradable. 13 If a ﬁrm is caught attempting to evade
the VAT, consistent with common practice, they must pay their taxes as well a penalty that
is proportional to the VAT. 14. Thus, an informal ﬁrm i’s expected VAT rate is vI(i) = η(i)ϕv
where ϕ > 1. 15 Thus, an informal ﬁrm’s proﬁts from the domestic market are:
π
informal
dom (i) = [(1   vI(i))p(i)q(i)   (a(i)q(i) + F)]   θ(i) (12)
12We could also make η(i) a function of some costly government enforcement and then endogenize this
choice. One way to interpret our given results would be to introduce a loss to government revenues repre-
senting the cost of a ﬁxed level of government revenue. This would not change any of our results. When
endogenized, this cost of enforcement would change the optimal mix of VAT and tariﬀs. Nevertheless, the
impacts isolated here - namely the changes in productivity from switching - would remain.
13Boadway and Sato (2009) consider tradable informal goods in a homogenous ﬁrm model, however, they
do not simultaneously consider tariﬀs and VAT.
14Typical values for the penalty are between ten and ﬁfteen percent of the VAT owed
15Thus, informal ﬁrms pay positive VAT in an expected sense. This informal ﬁrm VAT payment is quite
diﬀerent from that analyzed by Keen (2008) in which informal ﬁrms pay VAT on some of their inputs which
are themselves produced by formal ﬁrms.
10which yield equilibrium prices, quantities, and proﬁts of:
p
informal














(σ−1)µ   F (15)
Note that as with formal ﬁrms, the equilibrium domestic output of an informal ﬁrm is




′(i) > 0 (16)
and
ξ(i) = σ(1   vI(i))
−1a(i)η
′(i)ϕv + (σ   1)a
′(i) > 0 (17)
which ensure that informal ﬁrm quantities and proﬁts are falling in i, that is, the expected
VAT does not fall suﬃciently as ﬁrms become less eﬃcient so as to outweigh the increase
in marginal production costs. This seems reasonable since it eliminates any incentive to
operate at less the full productivity. Since exporters are caught with certainty, we do not
derive proﬁts for an informal exporter.
It is worth noting that since our VAT applies equally to all ﬁrms and the same tariﬀ
applies to all foreign exporters, a change in either variable is a comprehensive one, not
the selective tax reform studied by Emran and Stiglitz (2005). Given that international
convention is that taxes should be non-discriminatory, we adopt this approach. 16
2.4 Equilibrium Firm Cutoﬀs
With these equilibrium conditions, we can now describe the equilibrium cutoﬀ indexes for
each of the ﬁrm types. The home ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between being formal and informal
16For example, Article 24 of the OECD’s model tax convention (2003) rules out discriminatory VAT.
11is λf. This ﬁrm is the one such that the expected punishment for evading the VAT is equal
to the VAT itself. We assume that this ﬁrm is suﬃciently unproductive so that it would not
choose to export even if it were formal. 17 Therefore, equating the domestic proﬁts of being
a formal ﬁrm and the expected proﬁts from being an informal ﬁrm, we ﬁnd that:
η(λf)ϕ = 1. (18)
Note that λf depends only on ϕ, i.e. the proportion by which the penalty relates to
the VAT, not on the level of the VAT. This is because the marginal ﬁrm is presumed to
be viable as either a formal or an informal ﬁrm, i.e. an increase in the VAT does not
increase the marginal ﬁrm’s costs so much that it shuts down entirely. It is important to
recognize that this implies that the index of this ﬁrm will not change with the VAT, not
that the ﬁrm’s output (or the size of the formal and informal sectors) does not change.
Given the above assumptions, ﬁrms with indexes below λf will be formal while the rest
will be informal. This implies that the most productive, largest, and most proﬁtable ﬁrms
will be formal while the smallest and least productive ﬁrms will operate informally. This
is consistent with our anecdotal priors. Note that in our model, the driving force of ﬁrms
to choose formality over informality is the likelihood of their being caught cheating, which
is a function of their productivity which itself does not change with formality. Boadway
and Sato (2009) alternatively assume that sectors (in which all ﬁrms are identical) face a
productivity decrease if they become informal. 18 Thus, in their model, sectors with the
smallest productivity penalty are the most likely to become informal.
Using this, we can now describe ﬁrm N, an informal ﬁrm which is the last home ﬁrm to
17One could certainly consider the case where a ﬁrm would be indiﬀerent between being a purely domestic
informal ﬁrm or an exporting formal one. In this more complicated case, among other things, the foreign
tariﬀ would inﬂuence the formality decision. However, since in practice domestic formal ﬁrms do exist, we
assume that this simpler holds in our model.
18Keen (2008) considers a single ﬁrm’s choice, where the tradeoﬀ is between the ability to reclaim VAT on
purchased inputs versus the cost of paying the VAT itself. Since we do not have intermediate inputs in this
model, this facet does not appear.





(σ−1)µ = F. (19)
We assume that in equilibrium, N > λf, i.e. there is a positive mass of informal ﬁrms. Also,
from (19), note that if N is ﬁxed, so too is P. As a result, our small country assumption
that home cannot inﬂuence the number of foreign ﬁrms N∗ requires that the foreign price
index P ∗ is exogenous to home decisions.
Turning to the export decision, λx is the index of the ﬁrm for whom the variable proﬁts













∗(σ−1)µ = Fx. (20)
Note that since the foreign price index is a constant, λx is also non-responsive to the domestic
policy variables. 19 In addition, given our assumption on that the last formal ﬁrm λf does
not export, λx < λf. Foreign exporters, however, do respond to home policies. Denote the
index of the last foreign exporter with λ∗
x which, from 11, is given by:












(σ−1)µ = Fx. (21)





σ−1β(λf) + βI(λf,N) + (1   v)






19This cutoﬀ would depend on home policies if, for instance, the home government applied an export tax.
As discussed by Piermartini (2004), export taxes are an important feature of developing country trade policy.
We do not discuss them here for three reasons. First, given the independence of the export decision, their
inclusion would not change the comparison of tariﬀs on imports and VAT. Second, export taxes are often
applied to extract rent from foreign owned multinationals, a ﬁrm structure absent in our model. Third, for
















Government revenues come from three sources: VAT payments from formal ﬁrms, VAT
payments and penalties from caught informal ﬁrms, and VAT payments and tariﬀs collected
on imports from foreign exporters. These are used to provide the publicly-provided good G











(v + τ)p(i)q(i)di (23)




v(1   v)σ−1β(λf) + ϕv
N ∫
λf
η(i)(1   vI(i))σ−1a(i)1−σdi + (τ + v)(1 + τ)





3 The Impact of Taxes on Firms
The policy debate has centered on a revenue neutral shift from tariﬀs towards VAT. In this
section, we consider how a change in either home tariﬀs or the home VAT rate will aﬀect
the size of the formal sector, the size of the informal sector, and the number of exporters.
14We do this to develop intuition on how these changes aﬀect the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. In
the next section, we utilize these results to analyze the welfare impact of a revenue neutral
shift from tariﬀs towards VAT.
Since the export decision for home exporters depends on the foreign tariﬀ, the foreign
VAT and the number of foreign ﬁrms, the home export decision is independent of home tax
policy. Furthermore, the marginal formal home ﬁrm depends on ϕ, the proportional penalty,
not on the level of the VAT nor the tariﬀ. Therefore the equilibrium in the home market
is described by three variables, namely the last informal ﬁrm to enter (19), the last foreign
exporter (21), and the home price index (22), and all three depend on the home VAT and
tariﬀ.
3.1 Tariﬀs
First, we consider the impact of a marginal reduction in the tariﬀ rate.
Proposition 1. A reduction in the tariﬀ increases the mass of foreign exporters, reduces
the mass of domestic informal ﬁrms, and lowers the home price index. This lowers the size
of both the formal and informal sectors.
Proof. For notational simplicity, deﬁne:














































































x)g > 0 (26)
Thus, a reduction in the tariﬀ increases the number of ﬁrms exporting. This increases
competition increasing the price index. In turn, the rising price index lowers proﬁts for all
home ﬁrms, driving the least productive informal ﬁrms from the market. Since the home
ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between being formal and informal remains the same, this implies a
decline in the mass of informal ﬁrms operating in home.
In addition, since the equilibrium quantities for formal and informal home ﬁrms are
increasing in the price index, the decline in the price index lowers output by all home ﬁrms
that remain open. Since the mass of formal ﬁrms remains constant but each produces less,
a fall in the tariﬀ lowers the size of the formal sector. Since both the mass and the output
of informal ﬁrms decline, the tariﬀ reduction shrinks the size of the informal sector. 20
The intuition here is straight forward. When the tariﬀ falls, this increases the variable
proﬁt of a foreign exporter operating in the home market. As a result, foreign exporters
who formerly did not ﬁnd the home market suﬃciently proﬁtable to warrant the ﬁxed cost
of entering home will now choose to do so. This increases competition in home, reﬂected in
20Note that here we are speciﬁcally referring to informality in the diﬀerentiated goods sector. Thus, we
are not considering changes in production of the numeraire which, since it is untaxed, could be interpreted
as informal as well.
16a decline in the price index. This increase in competition lowers the proﬁts and output of all
domestic ﬁrms, both formal and informal. For those informal ﬁrms that were just covering
their costs before the decline in tariﬀs, this change leads them to exit the market.
This result highlights an aspect of the debate that has heretofore been unrecognized -
a decline in the tariﬀ itself can reduce the size of the informal sector. Note that it does
this both by reducing the number of informal ﬁrms operating in home and by reducing the
quantity produced by the informal ﬁrms that remain. Thus, the absolute size of the informal
sector shrinks as the tariﬀ declines. It is not possible, however, to analyze the size of the
informal sector as a percentage of home production without additional assumptions. This is
because the increased competition from lower tariﬀs also decreases output by formal ﬁrms.
Thus, depending on the mass of formal and informal ﬁrms, i.e. the distribution of types, the
net impact on the share of domestic production by the informal sector is contingent on the
parametrization of the model.
Turning to government revenues, the net impact is equally ambiguous. This is the result
of several conﬂicting eﬀects. First, consider tax payments by the foreign exporters who
were present in home before the tariﬀ drop. The decline in the tariﬀ obviously means that
less is collected on their initial level of exports. However, the tariﬀ drop also stimulates
their exports, leading to a rise in VAT revenues from this group. In addition, the tariﬀ
decline encourages additional foreign ﬁrms to begin exporting to home, resulting in a further
increase in both the tariﬀ and VAT tax base. The net eﬀect of these changes depends on the
shape of a(i), which aﬀects the responsiveness the index of the last exporter (which has a
further eﬀect on the extent of competition and thus output by other ﬁrms), the distribution
of productivities G(i), which governs the relative masses of these diﬀerent groups, and the
level of the markup which depends on the elasticity of substitution σ. Thus, the net change
in revenues from foreign ﬁrms is ambiguous (a result conﬁrmed in the simulations of the next
section).
Regardless of the net change in tax revenues from foreign ﬁrms, a decline in tariﬀs
17will lower the tax take from domestic ﬁrms. The increased competition caused by the tariﬀ
reduction impacts domestically generated tax revenues through two channels. First, it drives
out some domestic informal ﬁrms, some of which are caught and pay VAT and associated
penalties. This eﬀect would not arise in a model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, highlighting
the importance of endogenous entry. Second, the decline in the price index lowers production
by all domestic ﬁrms. This in turn lowers the VAT collected from both formal ﬁrms and those
informal ﬁrms that remain. This impact would be missing in a model of perfect competition,
illustrating the role of imperfect competition. 21 Thus, when considering the total revenue
impact of a tariﬀ decline, for it to be positive, it not only requires that the additional VAT
payments by foreign ﬁrms outweigh any decline in tariﬀ revenues, it must be the case that
this eﬀect outweighs the decline in domestic VAT receipts. This may help to explain the
ﬁndings of Devarajan, et. al (1999) and Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) which ﬁnd that many
countries experience net declines in tax revenues following trade liberalization.
3.2 VAT
Relative to the tariﬀ, the implication of a VAT change is less clear because it has both a
direct eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms as well as an indirect one that results from the VAT’s impact
on foreign exporters. This is discussed in our second proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in the VAT reduces the mass of foreign exporters. It has an
ambiguous eﬀect on the mass of domestic informal ﬁrms and the price level. Finally, it
reduces the size of the home formal sector but has an ambiguous eﬀect on the size of home’s
informal sectors.
21Keen and Ligthart (2002) also make this point in a simpler model.
18Proof. By direct calculation from the total diﬀerentials of (19), (21), and (22), we ﬁnd that:
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i.e. a marginal increase in the VAT drives away the last foreign exporter from the
home market. Note that because λ∗
X falls from an increase in v, implying an increase in
the productivity of the last foreign exporter, (21) implies that the equilibrium value of
(1 v)σP (σ−1) must fall as well. Note that this in turn reduces the quantity sold in home by
foreign exporters, all of which are formal.





















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is negative and represents the direct eﬀect of the
VAT. Since the VAT increase increases the penalty if caught and therefore expected costs,
this reduces proﬁts and tends to drive low productivity ﬁrms out of the market. This is
somewhat oﬀset, however, by the second term which captures changes in competition. Since
the VAT hike drives exporters from the market this reduces competition and increases proﬁts
for home ﬁrms. This tends to encourage entry by low productivity ﬁrms just as it did in
the tariﬀ case. The net eﬀect is in general ambiguous (a result conﬁrmed by simulations
in the next section). 22 This ambiguity results in an ambiguous change in the price level.
Inspection of (22) shows that the price index is decreasing in the VAT for a given set of ﬁrms.
22One way to resolve the ambiguity is to assume that η(i) is a step function under which above a certain i
a ﬁrm has zero probability of detection, i.e. there comes a point at which a ﬁrm is so small and unproﬁtable





dv < 0, this would imply that the mass of informal ﬁrms is strictly increasing in the VAT. However,
since one of our contributions is to illustrate the conﬂicting eﬀects the VAT has on informality, we maintain
the assumption that all informal ﬁrms face some positive probability of detection.
19However, it also depends on the masses of the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms changes in which is
ambiguous since dN/dv is also ambiguous. Note that although we know that (1 v)σP (σ−1)
falls from the VAT increase, this does not preclude a small rise in P.
Since the index of the last formal ﬁrm λf does not change with the VAT, to determine
the change in the size of the formal sector, we need only consider the change in the output
of a formal ﬁrm. Recall that from the change in the index of the last foreign exporter, we
know that the equilibrium value of (1   v)σP (σ−1) falls as the VAT rises. Recalling that a
home formal ﬁrm’s quantity for domestic sales is q
formal
dom (i) = (Ψ(1   v)−1a(i))
−σ P (σ−1)µ,
this implies that the output of all home formal ﬁrms falls, shrinking the size of the formal
sector.
Results for the informal sector are less clear and depend on three eﬀects. Recall the
output of an informal ﬁrm: q
informal
dom (i) = (1   vI(i))σ (Ψa(i))
−σ P (σ−1)µ. From this, we see
the ﬁrst eﬀect, namely the direct eﬀect of the VAT which increase costs for an informal ﬁrm,
reducing its output. Second, changes in competition will aﬀect the price index P thereby
aﬀecting output. As noted above, this eﬀect is ambiguous. Unlike home formal ﬁrms, we
cannot bypass this by relying on the fact that equilibrium value of (1   v)σP (σ−1) falls with
the VAT increase. The reason is that an informal ﬁrm only pays an expected VAT, not the
full VAT. Thus the direct marginal eﬀect on an informal ﬁrm from a VAT increase is less than
it is for a formal ﬁrm. Further, more productive informal ﬁrms (who face a greater chance
of detection) will respond more than less productive informal ﬁrms. If the probability of
detection is suﬃciently low, since we cannot rule out a small increase in the price index, we
cannot rule out an increase in output by some informal ﬁrms. Third, there is the ambiguous
change in the mass of informal ﬁrms. Therefore, we cannot determine the net eﬀect of a VAT
increase on the size of the informal sector. Likewise, the output of a formal ﬁrm depends on
these ﬁrst two eﬀects. Thus, just as it is unclear how these conﬂicting eﬀects work in the
informal sector, it is unclear how they will impact the formal one.
20Thus, as discussed and warned by Emran and Stiglitz (2005) an increase in the VAT
reduces the size of the formal sector, both by reducing output of home formal ﬁrms and by
restricting formal foreign ﬁrms. This does not, however, necessarily increase the size of the
informal sector. This will depend on how the direct eﬀect of an increase in the expected
VAT payment (which reduces informal ﬁrm output) balances out against the indirect eﬀects
(which can increase informal ﬁrm output and/or the number of such ﬁrms). Whether or
not an increase in the VAT will actually lead to a decrease in the size of the informal sector
depends on the responsiveness of foreign exporters to the VAT. This ambiguity translates
into ambiguity over the change in P with respect to v as well, leaving us unable to sign
changes in the output of either formal or informal ﬁrms.
These results imply that a change in either policy has several impacts on home welfare
above and beyond the obvious changes in government revenues and the publicly provided
good. Cole and Davies (2009) and Chor (2009) consider the impact of tariﬀs in heteroge-
neous ﬁrm models similar to the current one but without a VAT (and thus no informal ﬁrms).
They ﬁnd that, depending on the parameterization of the model, unilaterally optimal tariﬀs
can be negative. This result arises for two reasons. First, trade liberalization encourages a
selection eﬀect that shifts resources away from low productivity ﬁrms to high productivity
ﬁrms, creating a large boost in output for the varieties that remain. Second, since exporters
are productive they have lower prices and form a large part of the consumer’s consumption
bundle. Therefore a reduction in tariﬀs that lowers the price of imported goods removes
a large consumption distortion. In our model, trade liberalization will have similar eﬀects.
Increases in the VAT work much the opposite. First, changes in prices create consumption
distortions, both between domestic and foreign varieties and between formal and informal
varieties (as discussed by Piggott and Whalley (2001) and Emran and Stiglitz (2005)). Sec-
ond, there is the potential for an adverse selection eﬀect. This arises because the full VAT
applies to a formal ﬁrm while only a detection probability weighted-VAT applies to informal
ﬁrms. Furthermore, since high-productivity informal ﬁrms face a greater chance of being
21caught, even within the informal sector the distortion will be greater for more productive
ﬁrms. As such, the implied increase in the VAT will be greatest for the high-productivity
ﬁrms which form a greater part of the consumer’s consumption basket. This then heightens
the distortions Emran and Stiglitz highlight. Thus, there is no clear cut welfare results from
a revenue neutral shift between the two.
Nevertheless, two clear results stand out. First, trade liberalization itself can reduce the
size of the informal sector. This is a result that has not been discussed previously in the
literature. Second, an increase in the VAT has several conﬂicting eﬀects on informal local
ﬁrms. Because of the ambiguity resulting from the direct and indirect eﬀects of the VAT
as well as the complexity of the model, we now turn to numerical simulations both to show
that the ambiguities are actual ambiguities rather than an inability to sign the comparative
statics as well as to consider the welfare impacts of a shift from tariﬀs to VAT.
4 A Revenue Neutral Shift
In this section, we further parameterize the above model in order to discuss the ambiguities
regarding the VAT and informal ﬁrms and consider the impacts of a revenue neutral shift
from tariﬀs to VAT. 23 To begin with, we must pick speciﬁc forms for three key functions,
the mapping from i to unit costs, the mapping from i to probability of detection, and the
distribution of ﬁrm types (H(i)). Speciﬁcally, we assume that





H(a(i)) = 1   e
−Φi (31)
23Since the debate on the literature has been over the relative merits of these two policy instruments, we
do not consider changes in other policies such as ϕ, i.e. the penalty if caught, or η(.), the probability of
detection. This is not to imply that these are not worth considering, however, in order to compare our model
with the existing literature, we focus on tariﬀ and VAT changes.
22Furthermore, we must also parameterize several key variables in the model. Our baseline
values are listed in Table 2. Of particular note are two baseline values: the tariﬀ which is
set at .08 and the VAT which is set at .001. This latter value is set to a positive amount so
that not all ﬁrms are initially indiﬀerent to being formal or informal, yet is suﬃciently small
for us to consider the implementation of the VAT. We will also present results for a higher
level of the VAT for comparison.
Before considering the impact of a revenue neutral shift, we ﬁrst return to the ambiguity
on the eﬀect of a rise in the VAT on the number of informal ﬁrms. Recall that there were two
competing eﬀects. The ﬁrst was the direct eﬀect wherein an increase in the VAT increased
the expected penalty if caught, thereby driving the least productive informal ﬁrms from the
market. The second is an indirect eﬀect that, because of the decline in competition as the
VAT rises, encourages entry by low productivity informal ﬁrms. This latter term particulary
hinges on the distribution of ﬁrm types, i.e. on Φ, since this governs the rate of exit by foreign
exporters. Figure 1 illustrates how the sign of dN/dv changes as we change Φ. For low values
of the shape parameter, an increase in the VAT reduces the cutoﬀ for informal ﬁrms, i.e. the
direct eﬀect dominates. For relatively high values of the shape parameter the competition
eﬀect dominates and an increase in the VAT reduces the number of importers suﬃciently to
permit entry by low productivity informal ﬁrms. This indicates that our ambiguity is a true
ambiguity and not simply an inability to sign the comparative static. For our analysis, we
will focus on values the shape parameter for which the direct eﬀect dominates. 24
We now turn to the impacts of a revenue neutral shift. Figure 2 illustrates the required
change in the VAT to keep revenues constant following a one percentage point decline in
the tariﬀ for a range of tariﬀ values. As can be seen, when the tariﬀ is relatively high, even
for the low baseline VAT of .1 percent, a reduction in the tariﬀ can actually require the
VAT to fall to keep revenues neutral. This is because the decline in the tariﬀ leads to an
24We did not ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the VAT on N for alternative values of our other parameters, at
least within the ranges we simulated. This suggests that changes in the mass of exporters is of particular
importance.
23inﬂux of imports which generate VAT revenues. When this inﬂux is large, these new VAT
revenues more than oﬀset the decline in tariﬀ revenues. This suggests that the interaction
of tariﬀs and VAT are important when considering the potential revenue impacts, especially
for developing nations where tariﬀ levels are high relative to that in the developing world.
Since Boadway and Sato (2009) contrast VAT only and tariﬀ only situations, this interplay
is missing from their analysis. Note that in our baseline values, the VAT must increase in
response to the tariﬀ. Thus, as in Emran and Stiglitz (2005), we assume that the VAT is
below the peak of the Laﬀer curve and the tariﬀ is not greater than the Laﬀer curve’s peak.
This has two implications. First, consistent with the estimates of Devarajan, et. al (1999)
a reduction in the tariﬀ leads to a net revenue loss for home. This has been conﬁrmed for
low income countries by Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). Second, to oﬀset this, it requires an
increase in the VAT. This then places our simulations in the context of the current debate.
It is worth noting, however, that the required VAT changes are generally fairly small. This
is important in interpreting our simulated welfare changes because these small VAT changes
imply small price changes for ﬁrms and therefore smaller changes in consumer surplus.
Figure 3 illustrates the change in welfare from the revenue neutral change in the VAT for
diﬀering levels of σ, the elasticity of substitution. Diﬀering σs imply two diﬀerent things.
First, higher elasticities of substitution move the market closer to perfect competition, chang-
ing the impact of a tariﬀ or VAT change on ﬁrms. In our simulations, this serves to make
ﬁrm cutoﬀs less sensitive to policy changes. As by Keen (2008), one of the beneﬁts of a
revenue neutral shift is that it reduces distortions in the relative consumption of home and
foreign products. In the context of heterogeneous ﬁrms, as discussed by Chor (2009) and
Davies and Cole (2009), an additional beneﬁt of tariﬀ reduction is that trade liberalization is
that it increases the availability of foreign varieties to the home market and shifts resources
towards more productive ﬁrms (a selection eﬀect). Here, the selection eﬀect is strengthened
by the corresponding VAT increase which drives away low-productivity informal ﬁrms from
the market. As σ rises and ﬁrms move closer to perfect competition, however, this beneﬁt
24declines. The second impact of a higher σ is that it results in a lower equilibrium G for the
same baseline tariﬀ and VAT. As such, fewer revenues need to be maintained by increasing
the VAT. Therefore, the associated VAT increases are small, implying only small distortions
of the type highlighted by Emran and Stiglitz (2005). Therefore, for this parametrization
and range of values, as proposed by Keen (2008) a shift from tariﬀs towards VAT increases
welfare.
It is important to recognize, however, that this is contingent on the parametrization of
the model. Figure 4 shows the situation for a slightly diﬀerent baseline where τ = .13 and
v = .01. As can be seen, for higher elasticity of substitutions, welfare falls as the tariﬀ is
replaced by a VAT. This is because with higher baseline taxes, the revenues that must be
maintained during the shift from tariﬀs to VAT are larger. Therefore the associated VAT
increase are also higher, increasing the distortions warned of by Emran and Stiglitz (2005).
For low σ this is still dominated by the inﬂux of imports and the selection eﬀect. When
the elasticity of substitution is high, however, these other beneﬁts are smaller yielding a net
negative eﬀect. This implies that, although the policy prescription of Keen (2008) works in
some cases, including the baseline parametrization, it does not hold for all cases. Therefore
this is not a ”one size ﬁts all” policy and it is critical to analyze factors such as the initial
tariﬀ level, the size of the cut, and the anticipated increase in imports before applying it to
a given country.
Figure 5, which illustrates how the change in welfare depends on the initial level of the
tariﬀ (returning to the baseline VAT and σ), presents an alternative method of evaluating
the sensitivity of the welfare changes to the chosen parameters. When tariﬀs are initially
low, there is a welfare gain from switching from the tariﬀ to the revenue equivalent VAT. As




falling in the initial tariﬀ, i.e. when the initial tariﬀ is high, the ability to increase imports
is slight. Therefore the beneﬁts of Keen (2008) are outweighed by the distortions caused
by the VAT. Therefore, the welfare changes for very closed economies may well diﬀer from
25relatively open ones.
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates how the change in welfare depends on the initial level of the
VAT. As with Figure 5 the increase in welfare is greater for higher VATs. This is due to the
fact that, as the tariﬀ falls from its baseline level, the increase in imports raises additional
revenues through the VAT, thus requiring a smaller increase (or even a decrease) in the VAT
to replace those lost funds and smaller distortions to home production. This highlights an
important diﬀerence of such a shift for countries that already have established VATs and
those that do not.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore the impact of a shift from tariﬀs to VAT in the presence
of an informal sector. By using ﬁrm heterogeneity, unlike other treatments of the subject,
we neither exogenously assign ﬁrms to one sector or the other nor consider an equilibrium
in which all ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between sectors. This leads to several useful insights.
First, a tariﬀ cut itself can be useful in reducing informality. Second, it is not the case that
a shift from tariﬀs to VAT must lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. This is
because the penalty associated with non-payment is typically proportional to the VAT itself.
This then impacts both the output of all informal ﬁrms as well as the number of informal
ﬁrms that choose to stay in the market. For many parameter values, the net eﬀect of a VAT
increase is actually to decrease the size of the informal sector. Third, the welfare impact of a
shift from tariﬀs to VAT is sensitive to the chosen parameters. This is because the parameters
aﬀect the beneﬁts proposed by Keen (2008), namely the increase in imports, relative to the
VAT distortions warned of by Emran and Stiglitz (2005). In particular, when countries are
initially relatively closed, do not have high initial VAT levels, or have preferences that yield
nearly perfect competition, a revenue neutral shift from tariﬀs to VAT can lower welfare.
Thus, although there are some cases in which this shift can indeed improve welfare, caution
26must be exercised when deciding whether or not to implement such a policy.
In addition to the diﬀering eﬀects within the context of our model, we do not consider
other issues surrounding the use of VAT such as the role of trade in intermediate goods, po-
litical economy, or the cost of enforcement. We leave these for future research. Nevertheless,
it is our hope that by considering the roles of heterogeneity and endogenous entry help to
enrich the current debate and future research.
27Table 1: International Trade Taxes as a Percent of Total Revenue by Region (1996-2002)






Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East 14.2
Source: Bird and Ghendron (2007)
Table 2: Baseline Values for Simulations
Variable Interpretation Baseline Value
F Fixed Cost of a Domestic Plant 3
Fx Fixed Cost of Exporting 6
µ Utility Function Parameter/Amount Spent on Diﬀerentiated Good 2
σ Elasticity of Substitution 4
τ Ad-valorem Tariﬀ .08
ρ Lower Bound of Marginal Cost .3
Φ Shape Parameter in Exponential Distribution .25
v VAT Rate .001
ϑ Parameter of Detection Function 1
ζ Parameter of Unit Cost Function 1

















0 .5 1 1.5 2
shape_exp


































0 .1 .2 .3 .4
tau


























3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
sigma






























3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
sigma
Figure 4: The Change in Welfare from a Revenue Neutral Shift as it depends on the Elasticity
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